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# WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending 15 January 1972*

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






*Top Secret*

NSA review completed


# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

OCTOBER 1971 - JANUARY 1972  
Weekly data as reported

1968-1972  
Weekly average for each month




remained at the same level as last week with 5 reported.




climbed sharply from last week's 149 to 247. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.


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
include 7 regular, [ ] and 6 small, special purpose groups totaling some 4,743. The number of infiltrators noted moving toward South Vietnam and Cambodia since 1 October 1971 is now an estimated 59,500-61,500.



declined to 170 from last week's 177.




rose sharply to 1,034 from the 803 of last week.



as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces dropped to 95% from the 98% reported last week.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary



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### Enemy Activity

In north Laos, the battle for Long Tieng is still in progress as fighting continues for tactical positions commanding the Long Tieng valley. Despite the propaganda claims of Hanoi and the Pathet Lao, the town itself is still in friendly hands. The arrival of reinforcements and continuing air support have helped the allied side, but attempts to recapture enemy-occupied positions on the ridgeline overlooking the town have so far not been successful. While the momentum of the enemy's attack appears to have been temporarily blunted, the Communists have sufficient forces in the area which have not yet been committed to launch further heavy attacks. North Vietnamese logistics units are continuing to move large quantities of supplies into north Laos, a development which bears on Communist capabilities in the immediate Long Tieng area and also suggests that their Military Region (MR) II campaign objectives are not limited to Long Tieng.

Throughout the rest of Laos, there was little enemy activity during the past week, although increasing enemy pressure has been felt east of Pakse in the southern Panhandle.

In South Vietnam, the level of enemy-initiated activity remained low, though it increased slightly in the coastal lowlands of MRs 1 and 2. There were also more small contacts in MR 4 than occurred in the several previous weeks. Additional reports were received during the week referring to plans for the Communist "General Offensive" this spring. The buildup of enemy forces has also continued in the Western Highlands, in the south of North Vietnam near the DMZ, and in northwestern Quang Tri Province. All of this lends credence to the belief that the enemy intends to undertake a significant expansion of military activity some time within the next month or so.

Enemy action in Cambodia was at a low level during the past week, and the disposition of Communist forces indicates that it will remain so during the coming week. Most South Vietnamese forces have now been withdrawn from Cambodia for use in South Vietnam and those remaining have not made much contact with the enemy. This period of reduced ARVN presence in Cambodia could facilitate the efforts of Communist troops to prepare for possible offensive activities of their own later in the dry season.

### Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

Personnel infiltration continued at a brisk pace during the week as 4,700 men were added to the infiltration totals. This raises to 59,500-61,500 the number of North Vietnamese Army infiltrators accepted as having left the north for South Vietnam and Cambodia since 1 October 1971.

The Communists' increasing determination to challenge air attacks against North Vietnamese supply and infiltration corridors was re-emphasized last week by the deployment of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) further to the south than ever before in Laos. The continued deployment of SAM's in this area will markedly increase the threat to friendly aircraft striking at the main Communist routes through Laos.

### South Vietnamese Political Developments

The political scene in Saigon was quiet during the week.

Internationally, South Vietnam's continuing reaction to India's decision to raise its mission in Hanoi to full ambassadorial status has increased the likelihood of a fairly major diplomatic confrontation with New Delhi. Such a confrontation could have an impact on India's International Control Commission (ICC) chairmanship, the continued existence of the ICC in South Vietnam, and the continued presence of the Indian diplomatic mission in Saigon.

*Top Secret*